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Abstract: The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will have
been completed as of this writing, but will not yet have been published. Facing new strategic priorities and mounting fiscal pressures,
it is anticipated that the capacity or size of American landpower
will be substantially reduced: the Army’s end strength could be decremented to a post-World War II low of just 420,000 to 450,000
soldiers. This article considers the implications of such reductions.

T

he US Department of Defense (DOD) faces numerous challenges
today as it updates US defense strategy in light of a dynamic security environment and significant resource constraints. The QDR
affords landpower strategists an excellent opportunity to step back and
think about the future. As the former Pentagon strategist Shawn Brimley
wrote, “With wars ending, budgets declining, technology proliferating,
and other powers rising, a real window of opportunity to reshape US
defense strategy has opened for the first time since the end of the Cold
War.”1 However, that “window” also brings with it great risk.
Documents like the National Intelligence Council’s 2030 report
or the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Operating Environment suggest the
United States must have balanced and versatile forces able to accomplish
a wide variety of missions. Urgency is needed to create greater Joint
adaptability and versatility to cope with uncertainty and complexity.
Although niche capabilities will still be needed, a balanced force design
is the basis for adaptation and operational flexibility.

Landpower and Joint Force 2020

Landpower’s role in the 21st century was studied by a task force commissioned by the US Army, US Marine Corps, and Special Operations
Command. This effort produced a concept paper delineating what
landpower brings to the fight, and emphasizes achieving influence in
the human domain and winning the clash of wills inherent in human
conflict.2 It argues, persuasively, that “the importance of conflict
prevention and the ability to shape conditions in regions to maintain
stability through actions highly focused on human factors is also rising
in significance.”3 The interplay of human and moral factors in war is
something Clausewitz stressed, but which modern strategists might
deemphasize or inadvertently overlook.4

1     Shawn Brimley, “The Next QDR is the Last Chance for Sanity,” Defense One, July 15, 2013.
2     Raymond T. Odierno, James F. Amos, and William H. McRaven,Strategic Landpower; Winning
the Clash of Wills (Washington, DC: May 6, 2013), www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/StrategicLandpower-White-Paper-06MAY2013.pdf.
3     Ibid., 3.
4     Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Innovation, The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military
Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).
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The role of landpower is questioned in some quarters: it is equated
to protracted counterinsurgency tasks and portrayed as expensive. Some
critics think of the Army and Marines solely in terms of current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and hope to opt out of such “messianic”
missions and nation-building tasks. But after a decade of irregular war,
the contributions made by the Army, Marines, and Special Operations
Forces (SOF) should not be narrowly defined by the last decade or exaggerated concerns about “endless wars.” American landpower capabilities
have been broadened and deepened by a decade of sacrifice and adaptation. The tremendous learning curve and combat experience of the last
decade has produced a very flexible force, and the United States must
retain the best of that leadership, experience, and lessons. We should
not seek to refight the last war, nor should we recoil from a ruthlessly
realistic appreciation for the world as it is rather than what we hope it
may become. As noted by Major General H. R. McMaster:
. . . in Afghanistan and Iraq, planning did not account for adaptability and
initiatives by the enemy. American forces, deployed initially in insufficient
numbers to keep pace with the evolution of those conflicts, struggled to
maintain security. The lesson: The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, like all
wars, were contests of will that unleashed dynamics that made future events
impossible to predict. Fortunately, American forces adapted.5

The US military has not yet studied or drawn adequate lessons about the
factors that facilitated this adaptation.
Some national security analysts have questioned whether landpower
is necessary. Landpower is part of the Joint capability package and heavily
counted on to secure decisive results. Whether the debates center on the
missions, costs, or effectiveness, one should be wary of those critics promoting a new “Vietnam syndrome,” arguing the United States should
never again go down the path it did over the last decade.6 Playing to
this syndrome led directly to the problems encountered before, during,
and after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Some critics argue for
limited interventions or ideal conditions, “more El Salvadors” than
Vietnams or more short wars like Operation Desert Storm. The desire
for more Desert Storms and fewer Iraqi Freedoms is understandable. But
strategists cannot plan for convenient enemies—leaders who array their
forces in open desert terrain, who have no means to defend themselves
against US ground and air power, and thereby enable short, decisive
wars culminating in flower-strewn victory parades.7 But the future does
not bend to our preferences. To think there will not be messy conflicts
is to harbor dangerous illusions.8
Technology cannot offset the need for robust ground forces, nor can
it guarantee short wars. The policy community may not have fallen for

5     H. R. McMaster, “The Pipedream of Easy War,” The New York Times, July 21, 2013.
6     John Deni, “Land Power is Still Necessary,” The National Interest, June 4, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/land-power-still-necessary-8544.
7     Steven Metz and Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. “Don’t Give Up on Ground Troops,” The New
Republic, April 9, 2013.
8     Allegedly the President has asked for fewer Iraqi Freedoms and more Desert Storms, see James
Kitfield, “A Hollow Military Again?” National Journal, June 12, 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.
com/congress/a-hollow-military-again-20130612.

Special Commentary

Hoffman

9

“easy wars” or been seduced by the “lure of strike.”9 However, recent
defense studies suggest that the “technological optimists” are alive and
well again.10 We must be wary of their claims, having fallen for them too
many times already, at too tragic a cost.
Landpower confers the ability to create and apply control of terrain
and populations. When control is central to a strategy, landpower generates it. It is both high risk and high reward.

Strategic Planning and Landpower

The Pentagon’s strategic guidance includes a shift to the Asia-Pacific
region, a theater presumed to have a principally maritime character.11
The Pentagon’s guidance is on target in terms of priorities. With the
pivot to the Pacific, some superficial analysis has suggested,
It makes sense to shift resources toward maritime forces. Wars in that region
are more likely to be fought at sea than on land. Moreover, if the United
States is planning to avoid future stability and counterinsurgency operations,
like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, which require large numbers of boots on
the ground over multiple rotations, then the military will need considerably
fewer ground forces.” 12

But landpower is certainly not irrelevant to negating anti-access challenges, nor irrelevant to security challenges in the Pacific.13 There is
certainly ample opportunity for the Army, Marines, and Special
Operators to enhance regional security throughout the Pacific.14
Furthermore, while American geostrategic interests in the Persian
Gulf may diminish as the United States exploits the shale oil and gas
revolutions, no projection of American security interests can ignore the
complexities of political and social change in the Middle East, Africa,
South America, or Central Asia.15 The Joint Force will require landpower resources to advance US interests in those regions.
Landpower requirements are generated by DOD’s strategic planning
and resource allocation processes. The unpredictability of long-range
challenges makes that generation difficult. Force diversity is a healthy
antidote to the all too common failure to predict.16 Long-range planning
is essential; but the enemy does not have to respect US planning assumptions and theories of victory, nor fight in an accommodating manner.

9     One scholar contends that technological enthusiasm has historically led to strategic overreach
and unbalanced force designs, see Conrad Crane, “The Lure of Strike,” Parameters 43, no. 2 (Summer
2013): 7–17.
10     Mackubin T. Owens, “Reflections on Future War,” Naval War College Review, 61, no. 3 (Summer
2008): 62–73.
11     Leon Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington,
DC: Department of Defense, January 5, 2012), 6.
12     Cindy Williams, “Accepting Austerity: The Right Way to Cut Defense,” Foreign Affairs
(November/December 2013).
13     Jim Thomas, “Why The U.S. Army Needs Missiles,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2013), 114–120.
14     John R. Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Asia-Indo-Pacific,” Parameters 43, no. 3 (Autumn
2013).
15     Michael R. Eastman, “American Landpower and the Middle East of 2030,” Parameters 42, no.
3 (Autumn 2012): 6–17.
16     Richard Danzig, Driving in the Dark: Ten Propositions About Prediction and National Security
(Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, October 2011).
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Supposing that tomorrow’s adversaries will be only elusive guerrillas or that armored forces are passé is risky.17 Similarly, future crises
will require more than special operators. Integrated solutions applying
all three elements of the landpower triad (Army, Marines, and Special
Forces) will be needed. As noted in one report by the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), “the unique contributions of ground
forces—the ability to take and hold terrain, operate discriminately in
close proximity to vulnerable populations, and instill confidence in
allies and partners—will be no less vital in the coming decade.”18 Other
recent Defense Department-sponsored research finds that large-scale
interventions are not implausible, but US ground forces may need to
broaden their capability portfolios.19 Of paramount concern is the full
spectrum of warfare from major combat operations, stability operations,
and irregular warfare operations. These require persistent, steady-state
contributions from all three elements of the landpower triad.
The QDR results should refine the Defense Strategic Guidance
(DSG) regarding stability operations, incorporating one small-scale stability operation in its planning scenarios (much smaller than Operations
Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom). Planning for a 12- to 24-month,
medium-scale stability operation every 3 to 5 years would be a prudent
hedging strategy for a global power such as the United States. Something
like a Balkans or Libya operation is a rough scale. The current guidance
admits that US forces must be prepared for a full range of operations,
but it also states that the United States will seek to avoid substantial
engagement and prefers nonmilitary solutions. This suggests that training, preparation, and readiness for such missions is a low priority and a
poor allocation of time and resources. Furthermore, it does not authorize
any capacity.20 This has the unintended effect of retarding the institutionalization of irregular warfare as an equal warfighting capability to
conventional conflict, the lessons learned from a decade of war, and the
necessity of stability operation capabilities by the Army and Marines.

Force Sizing

To gain further traction with the policy community, landpower
leadership will have to present a compelling rationale for both future
capabilities and capacity. Fuzzy notions or historical bromides will not
suffice.21 From a Total Force perspective, today’s 1.15 million person
landpower “Triad” is impressive both qualitatively and in terms of
capacity. The sum landpower capacity in this “triad” includes the active
and Reserve/Guard elements from the Army, Marines, and SOF. Even
with planned reductions of nearly 100,000 Marines and Soldiers, the
United States will still have over a million Soldiers and Marines led by
battle-hardened professionals. We should retain a robust force, with the
17     An argument laid out effectively in Chris McKinney, Mark Elfendahl, and H. R. McMaster,
“Why the U.S. Army Needs Armor: A Case for a Balanced Force,” Foreign Affairs (May/June
2013); David E. Johnson, Heavy Armor in the Future Security Environment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
Occasional Paper, 2011).
18     Nathan Freier, U.S. Ground Force Capabilities Through 2020 (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, October 2011), vii.
19     Nathan Freier, Beyond the Last War: Balancing Ground Forces and Future Challenges Risk in
USCENTCOM and USPACOM (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
April 2013).
20     Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, 6.
21     Peter Singer, “From Fuzzy to Focused,” Armed Forces Journal, November 2013.
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diverse mix of capabilities (armor, mechanized, special operations, and
forcible entry) that we now possess.
The force-sizing construct the Pentagon used in this QDR is not
yet clear. But the DSG suggests the United States is prepared to respond
to two different kinds of major regional conflicts (MRCs). In one, the
United States will deploy a highly modernized and balanced Joint combined arms force to obtain decisive results, including full regime change.
In the second, the Pentagon intends to punish a country, or to deny it
from achieving the fruits of any aggressive action. This second scenario
is presumably dependent on strike assets and short on any ground forces
for security of allies or for stability operations in support of either the
ally or partner, or in any contested space impacted by the kinetic phase
of the operation. These shortfalls may be necessitated by sequestration
and limited dollars, but they pose risks for force planners to consider
and mitigate.
At least 18-20 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) may be required for
one MRC. Another 3 to 4 BCTs would be forward deployed at any time,
and this would require a total of 12 BCTs to ensure a sustainable rotation
basis and adequate training readiness. This rationale might suggest we
need an Army of 30 to 32 maneuver BCTs. However, the minimum
Army force structure is not simply the sum of these two major requirements. Presumably, some part of the forward deployed force will be
postured in the critical region, and engaged at the onset of a conflict.
Counting the earlier proposal for a stability scenario, a requirement to
retain no less than 32 active BCTs with moderate risk appears valid. The
challenge for Army leaders and force planners is the requisite reductions
in the institutional army, force generation capacity, and infrastructure to
free resources to preserve this core component of the Army. Significant
reductions in base overhead and civilian personnel will be required, as
many as one third of all civilian billets may be reduced over the Future
Years Defense Program to preserve the deployable core of the US landpower force.
While overall force size is not irrelevant, the quality and readiness
of the force matter.22 There has been too much emphasis on the quantity
and size of each service, and not enough on quality and future concepts.
It is unwise to retain a larger force structure than one can properly train
and equip. The QDR should reflect that, even if fiscal limits drive down
capacity and drive up strategic and operational risks.
Realistic thinking is also needed about what is occurring among
traditional US allies and partners. North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) force reductions need to be factored in as they are announced.
As noted by RAND, “The result of the anticipated cuts and future
financial constraints is that the capacity of the major European powers
to project military power will be highly constrained.”23 This reduced
capacity will mean an even greater burden for the United States in allied
and partner operations.
22     Frank G. Hoffman and Mike Noonan, “Defense Reorganization Under Sequestration,”
(Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute), July 2013.
23     Frank Larabee et al., NATO and the Challenge of Austerity (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MG1196-OSD, 2012); Steven Erlanger, “Shrinking Europe Military Spending Stirs Concern,” The New
York Times, April 23, 2013.
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Total Force Mix

The active/reserve force mix presents additional issues with regard
to readiness and risk. At present, the US military has a total of 18 divisions in the Army and National Guard (10/8 respectively), and another
4 in the Marine Corps, including its single reserve division. Planned
reductions will cost the Army approximately two Division equivalents
(10 to 12 Brigades), and the Corps approximately two of its nine regiments. How much combat power is needed in the Active Component,
and with what mix of capabilities?
Proposals vary from one think tank to another, but increasing the
readiness or size of the reserve component may preserve the capacity needed within sharp funding constraints.24 While much progress
was made in the last decade, more can be leveraged from a properly
resourced Reserve Component.25 In planning for austere times, the
United Kingdom shifted toward a higher reliance on its reserve component, and there are calls in the United States to do the same.26 The QDR
must carefully consider how this can be done to preclude a degradation
in conventional deterrence or the ability to respond to crises in a timely
manner. Moreover, one needs to be realistic about limited reserve training time. The complexity of modern warfare suggests the Age of the
Minuteman is long gone.27 Shifting missions and risk to the Reserves
may be a smart call to mitigate uncertainty, but it is the wrong way to
cut defense. We need a far more rigorous assessment of Reserve and
Guard response timelines, and a better idea of what is necessary to place
a greater reliance on the Reserve Component.
Assessments of risk, readiness, and required response timelines need
to be conducted and validated.28 Allies face unruly neighborhoods far
abroad. Simply shifting forces into the Reserve, and expecting warning
and mobilization times of six months or nearly a year are not consistent
with preserving stability, reassuring our allies, or meeting treaty obligations.29 That is the wrong way to cut defense
Special Operations. Current guidance, as well as General David
Barno’s notion of future “Wars of Shadow,” define a need to preserve if
not extend Special Operations capacity.30 Obviously, US special operations forces should be sized to provide their unique capabilities across
the conflict spectrum, not just for direct action or for building partner

24     Todd Harrison et al., “Strategic Choices Exercise Outbrief,” (Washington, DC: Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 29, 2013), http://www.csbaonline.org/
publications/2013/05/strategic-choices-exercise-outbrief/.
25     John Nagl and Travis Sharp, An Indispensable Force, Investing in America’s National Guard and
Reserves (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, September 2010), 9.
26     Clark Murdock, “Strategic Choices Exercise Outbrief,” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, May 29, 2013).
27     
Julian Tolbert and Stephen J. Mariano, “Time for Minutemen is Past,”
Philadelphia
Inquirer,
June
2,
2013,
http://articles.philly.com/2013-06-02/
news/39693054_1_world-war-ii-u-s-army-u-s-air-force
28     Bill Hix and Bob Simpson, “In strategy, 2 out of 3 is bad: Proposed Army cuts go dangerously astray,” Armed Forces Journal International, June 2013.
29     Williams, “Accepting Austerity.”
30     For more recommendations see Linda Robinson, The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report No. 66, April 2013).
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capacity or engagement.31 Investments are required to ensure this,
including some continued growth in the Special Operations Command
in the next few years. Modernization for special operators cannot be
overlooked. As Admiral McRaven noted earlier this year, “Mobility,
lethality, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and survivability
remain critical SOF enablers for the full spectrum of SOF operations.”32
The QDR should ensure these enablers are procured.
Enhanced interdependency between conventional and special
forces is also desirable. However, our Special Forces will be consumed
with Wars of Shadow, and the rest of the triad will have to support
missions of long duration, patiently developing long-term relationships
for successful partnerships, training and advisory tasks, and capacity
building.33
Human Domain Investments. As noted in the Strategic Landpower
White Paper, “the success of future strategic initiatives and the ability
of the United States to shape a peaceful and prosperous global environment will rest more and more on our ability to understand influence, or
exercise control within the human domain.”34 Joint doctrine may not
need to institutionalize a Human Domain, but it is one way for the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the services to ensure
valuable lessons and programs from the last decade of war are not inadvertently shed in the struggle for fewer resources. Key human terrain,
educational, and sociocultural programs are being phased out due to
fiscal constraints. These programs are often associated with humancentric or irregular conflicts, when they are actually relevant to strategic
influence, and the entire range of military operations. Such trends will
not enhance America’s ability to influence events in an increasingly competitive environment. Engineering and technology are national fortés,
and we should continue to exploit them, but we should also try to close
the gaps between ourselves and foreign cultures.35

Conclusion

The QDR process is more important than the final document, and
represents a critical opportunity to shape future US defense strategy
and tomorrow’s land component. Policymakers must examine trends
to anticipate myriad conflicting dynamics. Many features of the world
looming ahead are not new, and reflect enduring elements of human
conflict. Other aspects reflect both evolutionary and revolutionary
possibilities. While technology should be sought to afford US forces a
relative advantage, it should not be pursued in lieu of regard for context
or in a mistaken belief that it produces decisive results by itself.
We need to be more humble about our track record when it comes
to strategic foresight. According to some, over-optimism is an enduring
31     Admiral William H. McRaven, U.S. Navy, Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven,
USN, Commander, United States Special Operations Command Before the 113th Congress Senate Armed Services
Committee, March 5, 2013, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2013/03%20March/
McRaven%2003-05-13.pdf.
32     Ibid., 11.
33     David Maxwell, “Thoughts on the Future of Special Operations,” Small Wars Journal, October
31, 2013.
34     Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, Strategic Landpower, 3.
35     Anna Simons, 21st Century Cultures of War (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute,
April 2013).
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element in the American Way of War.36 Our record of prediction is actually fairly good, we are always optimistic and always wrong. War is a
perennial reality, yet one that we must try to prevent and limit in terms
of both frequency and consequence. Landpower will continue to play a
critical role in this task, as long as we have enough of it.

36     Donald Chisholm, “The Risk of Optimism in the Conduct of War,” Parameters 33, no. 4
(Winter 2003/2004): 114–131; Joseph Collins, “Of Groundhogs and Ground Combat,” Small Wars
Journal, April 11, 2013.

